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Abstract Crowdfunding has enabled large crowds to
fund innovative projects. This type of funding might tap
into the wisdom of crowds who were previously discon-
nected from the funding process. We distinguish be-
tween in-crowd and out-crowd funders (with and with-
out ties to project creators) in order to test for heteroge-
neity in their information use. Based on the analysis of a
large-scale survey amongst project funders, this paper
shows that in-crowd investors rely more on information
about the project creator than out-crowd investors. Out-
crowd investors do not seem to attach more importance
to information about the project itself than in-crowd
investors, except in the case of donation-based
crowdfunding. For financial return crowdfunding, fi-
nancial information becomes less important once a
strong relationship with the project creator is
established. Our study allows project creators to target
information to specific audiences based on their rela-
tionship strength across different types of crowdfunding
projects.
Keywords Crowdfunding . Social networks . New
ventures . Entrepreneurial finance . Information
asymmetries
JEL codes G23 .G32 .D82 .D85 .L26
1 Introduction
The funding of innovative start-ups has always been
challenging due to a lack of track record, collateral and
technological uncertainty (Engel and Stiebale 2014;
Hall 2002; Giudici and Paleari 2000). More generally,
small- and medium-sized firms face greater capital con-
straints than large firms, lacking access to market-based
funding due to the high fixed costs associated with
issuing equity and the unwillingness of institutional
investors to take small holdings. This leaves start-ups
highly dependent on bank credit, venture capital funds,
angel investors and bootstrapping for their liquidity
needs (Chittenden et al. 1996; Ebben and Johnson
2006; Giudici and Paleari 2000; Keasey and
McGuinness 1990). Access to bank credit has become
more transactional in recent decades with increased
centralization and computerised assessment of credit-
worthiness (Bhidé 2010) and is often restricted due to
a lack of profit and collateral. This shift severely affects
innovative small firms due to their disproportionate
reliance on soft information in the lending process
(Brancati 2014; Cosci et al. 2016). Furthermore, the
willingness of venture capitalists to fund start-ups is
often limited to certain sectors (Huyghebaert et al.
Small Bus Econ (2018) 50:251–273
DOI 10.1007/s11187-016-9829-3
F. Polzin (*) : E. Stam
Utrecht University School of Economics (USE), Kriekenpitplein
21-22, PO Box 80125, 3508 TC Utrecht, The Netherlands
e-mail: f.polzin@uu.nl
F. Polzin
Sustainable Finance Lab (SFL), Kriekenpitplein 21-22, PO Box
80125, 3508 TC Utrecht, The Netherlands
H. Toxopeus
Impact Centre Erasmus (ICE), Erasmus School of Accounting and
Assurance, Burgemeester Oudlaan 50, 3062 PA Rotterdam,
The Netherlands
2007) and there is evidence that the financial crisis has
dampened their willingness to invest, particularly in
follow-up rounds (Block and Sandner 2009; Cowling
et al. 2016; Migendt et al. 2014). Structural financing
constraints for small firms impede economic growth
when firms downplay their growth strategy to match
available funds (Beck and Demirguc-Kunt 2006; Binks
and Ennew 1996; Chittenden et al. 1996; Rostamkalaei
and Freel 2015).
The rise of crowdfunding over the past decade in part
addresses this funding gap by offering entrepreneurs an
al ternat ive to t radi t ional f inance channels .
Crowdfunding caters well to innovative, opaque, small
firms and makes use of social networks in the funding
process (Colombo et al. 2015; Vismara 2016a). It builds
on and expands beyond the traditional ‘in-crowd’ of
family and friends by allowing both in- and out-crowd
investors to provide finance through digital platforms
(Bruton et al. 2015; Salomon 2016). Furthermore, it has
lowered the transaction costs for entrepreneurs to collect
small investment amounts from a dispersed set of inves-
tors and is becoming an increasingly sizable source of
funding for start-ups and other bottom-up initiatives in
the economy (Massolution 2015; Wardrop et al. 2015).
However, it is unclear whether crowdfunding provides
access to the wisdom of the crowd, or whether it opens
up a wider audience of fools alongside the usual family
and friends in-crowd.
In line with the growth of crowdfunding, academ-
ic research directed at understanding this phenome-
non has emerged in recent years (Moritz and Block
2016). Much of this literature focuses on success
factors driving crowdfunding campaigns, such as
the role of early contributions (Agrawal et al.
2015; Cholakova and Clarysse 2015; Colombo
et al. 2015). There is also considerable attention on
the role of social networks in crowdfunding
(Agrawal et al. 2015; Horvát et al. 2015; Hui et al.
2014 ) and on ove r c oming i n f o rma t i o na l
asymmetries (Ahlers et al. 2015; Lin et al. 2012;
Vismara 2016b). Lacking attention until now is the
bridge between these two topics, namely, how social
networks affect the type of information used by
investors in crowdfunding decision making. Al-
t h o ugh t h e r e a r e s u gg e s t i o n s r e g a r d i n g
crowdfunding information mechanisms and the role
of social networks (Ter Wal et al. 2016), there is
little empirical evidence about the type of informa-
tion that funders use to make investment decisions.
Are crowdfunders well informed about the project
they invest in or are they jumping on a band-wagon
set in motion by other investors in a campaign?
This study offers the first detailed empirical analysis
on heterogeneity in information use by crowdfunders
and how this is affected by their social networks. The
ability to distinguish between investors based on their
interpersonal ties to the entrepreneur offers insights into
the application of theories about information
asymmetries and social networks in funding decisions
and serves as input for public policy for entrepreneur-
ship and finance. Our main research question is: How
does the type of information used by crowdfunders vary
with the strength of their ties to project creators?
This article is structured as follows: first, we review
the relevant literature and introduce the theoretical
framework. Next, we present the research design includ-
ing our quantitative research approach and data.We then
display the results which form the basis for the conclu-
sions in the final section.
2 Literature review and theoretical framework
2.1 Signalling in early-stage finance and information
cascades
The way entrepreneurs obtain capital when forming a
new firm has important implications for future perfor-
mance (Bosma et al. 2004; Cassar 2004). Their search
for external finance is characterised by agency problems
between the entrepreneur and funder due to information
asymmetries that lead to adverse selection and moral
hazard (Denis 2004; Jensen and Meckling 1976; Parker
2009). This is especially the case for new firms that face
high financing costs (Rostamkalaei and Freel 2015)
driven by cumbersome information gathering, a lack
of track record and, often, collateral (Blumberg and
Letterie 2007; Cassar 2004).
Scholars suggest signalling can overcome these
agency problems (Akerlof 1970; Amit et al. 1990;
Gompers 1995; Myers and Majluf 1984; Stiglitz and
Weiss 1981). Signalling can take place using different
kinds of information, for example, the availability of
patents and prototypes or the track record of entrepre-
neurial team (Audretsch et al. 2012; Becker-Blease and
Sohl 2015; Busenitz et al. 2005; Gompers and Lerner
2001; Spence 1973). Many studies in the signalling
literature establish a positive relationship between
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early-stage investments and firm success (Bernstein
et al. 2016a; Bosma et al. 2004; Kerr et al. 2014;
Kortum and Lerner 2000; Samila and Sorenson 2010)
and link an entrepreneur’s characteristics, such as hu-
man capital, to venture performance (Becker-Blease and
Sohl 2015; Ouimet and Zarutskie 2014; Pukthuanthong
2006). Bernstein et al. (2016b) examine venture attri-
butes used to signal quality to investors, i.e. the team,
track-record of the venture and identity of current inves-
tors. They suggest that information about the person(s)
behind the venture is crucially important for obtaining
external finance, which is in line with the practice of VC
and business angels (Alexy et al. 2012; Becker-Blease
and Sohl 2015; Vismara 2016a).
Crowdfunding,1 as a new form of seed finance, acts
as a platform (agent) between investors and entrepre-
neurs (Bruton et al. 2015; Cumming et al., 2015b;
Harrison 2013; Salomon 2016). A growing interest
and body of research is emerging into this new form of
entrepreneurial finance (for reviews see Kuppuswamy
and Bayus 2015; Mori tz and Block 2016) .
Crowdfunding combines features of a two-sided market
platform with underlying networking technologies. The
real-time, open and online insight into the commitment
of previous funders, as well as extensive targeted de-
scriptions of the fundraising campaign, is a specific
signal of crowdfunding (Bruton et al. 2015). The quality
of these signals as input into investment decisions is
questionable since the crowd might neither have exper-
tise in production, marketing and competition nor are
they likely to invest in due diligence given high fixed
costs (Belleflamme et al. 2013; Vismara 2016a). As
such, the wisdom of the crowd is not self-evident. On
the one hand, the crowd could represent new customers,
delivering knowledge about the market potential of an
offering by signing up as funders. On the other, they
could be free-riding on the—potentially unwise—in-
vestment decisions of others, and ‘herd’ without adding
any new information to a decision process
(Bikhchandani et al. 1992).
Hornuf and Schwienbacher (2015) find that specific
kinds of information, such as updates to investors, sig-
nificantly drive investment as funders update their pref-
erences in the light of project assessment. Moritz et al.
(2015) examined investor communication in equity
crowdfunding, highlighting that perceived sympathy,
openness and trustworthiness in the relationship be-
tween venture and investor reduced perceived informa-
tion asymmetries. They also found that third-party com-
munication influences the decision-making process of
crowdfunders. Furthermore, allowing crowdfunders to
adjust privacy settings regarding information about their
contribution deters some investors but increases average
contribution size (Burtch et al. 2015).
This suggests that some form of quality signalling
between project creator and crowdfunder occurs which
relates to the general notion of the ‘wisdom of the
crowd’ in funding decisions (Mollick and Nanda 2015;
Surowiecki 2005). But how does the crowd gather its
‘wisdom’? Literature on investment processes suggest
that this is facilitated by the social networks of both
entrepreneur and investor (Alexy et al. 2012; Colombo
et al. 2015; Ter Wal et al. 2016; Uzzi 1999).
2.2 Ties that bind, ties that blind: social networks
and information
Social networks strongly influence an entrepreneur’s
funding success as these provide access to resources
such as finance, knowledge and partners (Davidsson
and Honig 2003; Dubini and Aldrich 1991; Huang and
Knight 2015; Kwon and Arenius 2010; Shane and
Cable 2002). Social network theory provides a possible
lens to study the role of information in the relationship
between funder and venture (Granovetter 1973; Hoang
and Antoncic 2003; Jack and Anderson 2002; Kwon
and Arenius 2010; Uzzi 1999). Granovetter (1973, p.
1361) defines the notion of ‘strength’ of interpersonal
ties based on ‘a combination of the amount of time, the
emotional intensity, the intimacy and the reciprocal ser-
vices which characterize the tie’.
Social networks, comprising both strong and weak
ties, may affect the type of information used in a financ-
ing decision through three mechanisms. First, the
funder’s motivation for investing, for example, for fi-
nancial return or to strengthen an existing relationship,
will affect the information required (Belleflamme et al.
1 Following previous work we distinguish four types of crowdfunding
(Ahlers et al. 2015; Belleflamme et al. 2014; Mollick 2014; Nesta
2014): Purely donation-based crowdfunding exists that involves only
intangible returns. Reward-based crowdfunding (or pre-ordering) con-
sists of pledging an amount of money in exchange for future products.
Lending-based crowdfunding can be compared to micro-loans, where
the backer lends a certain amount of money to the project creator.
Equity-based crowdfunding issues shares in the company behind the
call, which are distributed amongst the funders according to the value
of their contributions. The latter two are combined throughout this
paper and referred to as ‘financial crowdfunding’.
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2014; Shane and Cable 2002). Second, the extent to
which interpersonal ties develop and enforce common
norms of behaviour will affect the perceived moral
hazard of an investment (Bernstein et al. 2016a;
Granovetter 2005; Uzzi 1999). This may make
obtaining information about the entrepreneur more at-
tractive than information about the project, its objec-
tives, risk and finance. Third, the way in which quality
signals are disseminated and received may vary based
on the strength of the relationship, affecting informa-
tional asymmetries (Ter Wal et al. 2016). For example,
funders with weak ties to the project creator consume
novel information more readily than those with stronger
ties (Alexy et al. 2012; Granovetter 1973; Ter Wal et al.
2016). However, in situations of risk and uncertainty,
reliance on multiple, more trustworthy information
sources may favour funders with stronger ties to the
project creator (Centola and Macy 2007; Ter Wal et al.
2016).
Crowdfunding could be classified as a new form of
relationship-based financial intermediation, exploiting
the local knowledge and trust embedded in social net-
works to provide quality signals about the project crea-
tor and their project. The mechanisms at play could be
similar to those seen in venture capital and angel invest-
ment. Relationships are built between financier and
venture as well as between syndicates of financiers to
mitigate information asymmetries (Alexy et al. 2012;
Gompers 1995; Gompers and Lerner 2001; Yao-Wen
2010). Social ties between investors are formed every
time they are attracted to the same target company
(Sorenson and Stuart 2008; Ter Wal et al. 2016).
Several scholars (Agrawal et al. 2015; Belleflamme
et al. 2014; Lin et al. 2012; Mollick 2014; Ordanini et al.
2011; Vismara 2016a) show that the size of a founder’s
social network is positively associated with the capital
raised for a project and the subsequent success of the
project in both reward-based and equity crowdfunding;
this effect does not hold in a donation-based setting
(Burtch et al. 2013; Kuppuswamy and Bayus 2015).
Furthermore, the relationship between funders and
project creators affects investment sequencing through
information cascades. Individual funders possess differ-
ent levels of information; hence, some investors have an
advantage over others (Cumming et al. 2015a;
Hildebrand et al. 2016). When professional investors
with industry experience and track record enter relative-
ly early in a crowdfunding campaign, their public visi-
bility attracts other investors (Vismara 2016b), in a
similar way as in other online market places
(Dellarocas 2003; Lin et al. 2012). This suggests that
the quality indication process with crowdfunding is
staged, with an in-crowd to out-crowd sequence, using
different types of information and levels of expertise to
make a funding decision.
2.2.1 In-crowd information needs
We define the in-crowd as those project funders who
have strong or weak interpersonal ties with the project
creator. On crowdfunding platforms, investors base their
decisions on information provided by the project creator
in the form of updates during the campaign and on the
investment behaviour and comments of other crowd
investors (Hornuf and Schwienbacher 2015). In-crowd
information requirements could be affected by the three
mechanisms outlined above: funder motivation, project
creator intentions and information flow.
Firstly, the in-crowd may have different motivations
than wanting to contribute to a successful project, such
as reinforcing their relationship with the project creator,
social obligation or altruism (Belleflamme et al. 2014;
Gartner et al. 2011; Klyver et al. 2016; Shane and Cable
2002). This could make them less inclined to search for
quality signals about the project itself and focus more on
information about the person behind the project. Sec-
ondly, we expect that funding decisions embedded with-
in a social network will decrease fears of negative be-
haviour by the project creator (Bernstein et al. 2016a;
Granovetter 1985; Uzzi 1999). This motivates the fund-
er to seek information about the person behind the
venture, increasing trust along with relationship
strength. Third, and central to our argument, social
networks support the flow of information which signal
quality of projects and entrepreneurs (Alexy et al. 2012;
Ter Wal et al. 2016). Instead of relying on formal
sources of information (such as project websites and
media), in-crowd funders may place higher weight on
information coming through their personal relationship
with the project creator, which they expect to be more
accurate and proprietary, giving them an edge over
publicly available information. In line with Ahlers
et al. (2015), Cholakova and Clarysse (2015) and
Cumming et al. (2015b), we expect the in-crowd to
gather (soft) information about the characteristics of a
project’s management (track record, size or level of
education) as this affects probability of success of the
venture. Due to existing ties, obtaining and processing
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this person-to-person information about management or
initiators is less costly than for out-crowd funders. Ad-
ditionally, relationships may imply a longer-term com-
mitment to the entrepreneur and therefore a longer term
perspective on the costs and benefits of investing in
information gathering about the entrepreneur (Boot
2000; Brancati 2014; Scholtens 1999).
Hypothesis 1 In-crowd funders are more likely to
rely on information about the person(s) behind the pro-
ject than out-crowd funders.
2.2.2 Out-crowd information needs
We define the out-crowd as those project funders
who have no personal ties to the project owner. We
expect this to lead to different information needs
through the same three mechanisms. First, without
the funding decision embedded in a social relation-
ship, the motivation is more likely to be based on
expected results, such as financial return (Cholakova
and Clarysse 2015), a finished product or societal
impact rather than social capital (Apinunmahakul
and Devl in 2008) or communi ty benef i t s
(Belleflamme et al. 2014). Information about the
project, its objectives, finance and risk will be more
relevant as it gives insight into the expected return
of the project (Ahlers et al. 2015; Belleflamme et al.
2013, 2014). Secondly, information gathering about
the project team is unlikely to reduce moral hazard
as there is no relationship to enforce social reward or
punishment (Belleflamme et al. 2014; Vismara
2016a). Third, as the out-crowd lacks direct insights
from the project creator, they depend on information
that reaches them through formal direct (project
websites, newsletters) or indirect (media) channels
(Hornuf and Schwienbacher 2015). Information
about the project creator obtained through formal
channels is often perceived as less trustworthy and
more difficult to interpret as a quality signal than
when obtained through interpersonal ties. As such, it
loses its advantage over more general information
about the project and its objectives (Hornuf and
Schwienbacher 2015; Vismara 2016a). We expect
out-crowd funders to be less motivated than in-
crowd funders to gather information about the pro-
ject team and to instead focus more on ‘traditional’
quality signals such as the nature of the project or
venture and its strategy (Ahlers et al. 2015; Hornuf
and Schwienbacher 2015).
Hypothesis 2 Out-crowd funders are more likely to
rely on information about the project and its objectives
than in-crowd funders.
Furthermore, we expect out-crowd funders to rely
more on information about financial planning and risk
than in-crowd funders due to stronger instrumental
(results-based) motivation and a lack of personal access
to the project owner. A recent study on equity
crowdfunding shows that the decision to invest is pos-
itively associated with the funders’ interest in rewards
(Cholakova and Clarysse 2015). Ahlers et al. (2015)
study the effectiveness of quality attributes and the level
of uncertainty in offer documents used to encourage
(small) investors to invest in an equity crowdfunding
context. They highlight the importance of financial pro-
jections for crowdfunding success. The absence of ties
to the project owner creates an incentive to look for
alternative, objective quality signals and leads funders
to investigate information about financial planning and
risk more thoroughly than in-crowd funders (Ahlers
et al. 2015; Busenitz et al. 2005; Hornuf and
Schwienbacher 2015).
Besides providing a quality signal, information about
financials and risk can also reduce the perceived risk of
moral hazard by revealing the commitment level of the
project creator, such as whether or not they provide
personal collateral and/or invest their own resources
(Blumberg and Letterie 2007). We therefore expect that
out-crowd funders rely more on information about fi-
nancial planning and risks than in-crowd funders,
looking both for quality signals and to reduce perceived
moral hazard risk.
Hypothesis 3 Out-crowd funders are more likely to
rely on information about financial planning and risks
than in-crowd funders.
3 Methodology
3.1 Research design
In this paper, we seek to understand the effect of the
strength of interpersonal ties on the information used by
crowdfunders. In order to test the hypotheses formulated
above, we constructed the analytical model presented in
Fig. 1. Most of the literature to date uses project-level
investment data that includes varying degrees of infor-
mation about the project and its creator. However, this
type of data does not convey much information about
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the project funders themselves. To analyse the
hypothesised relations, we used a large-scale survey of
crowdfunders (Cholakova and Clarysse 2015; Mollick
2015). We note that this methodological approach is
potentially vulnerable to common method bias (i.e.
gathering all information for this analysis via one sur-
vey) which has been shown to affect survey data
(Podsakoff et al. 2003). Whilst we could not conceptu-
ally identify any underlying factors that the predictor
and criterion variables had in common, we adopted
several measures to reduce potential bias. We started
by minimizing item ambiguity which included avoiding
vague concepts, complicated syntax and unfamiliar
terms. We deliberately used simple, specific and concise
questions to measure the constructs. The respondents
were also guaranteed anonymity.
3.2 Data
We use data from a large-scale survey called the ‘Na-
tional Crowdfunding Research’ conducted in 2013 in
The Netherlands with 1278 individual respondents.2
Respondents were surveyed regarding their participa-
tion in crowdfunding, on topics such as their invest-
ments, motivation and use of information in investment
decisions. It targeted both active crowdfunders as well
as non-crowdfunders. The research was organised by
the Dutch National Crowdfunding Association. A
snowball sampling method was used which drew on
the personal and organisational networks of participat-
ing organisations. About 300 responses included our
variables of interest (see Fig. 1). Of these, the respon-
dents had participated in either donation, reward-based
or financial return (debt and equity) crowdfunding
through all types of platforms (mainly, but not only,
Dutch platforms). The sample is representative of other
active crowdfunders in terms of age and education
(Mollick 2015).
3.2.1 Dependent variables
We created several dependent variables as proxies for
use of information, with a distinct question in the survey
where respondents rated the importance of six different
types of information in their decision to crowdfund.
These types of information were (1) information about
the project or the company, (2) information about the
objectives of the project or the company (Ahlers et al.
2015; Hornuf and Schwienbacher 2015), (3) informa-
tion about the person or organization behind the project
or the company, (4) information about previous projects
of the person or organization behind it (Bernstein et al.
2016b; Cholakova and Clarysse 2015), (5) information
about the financial planning of the project or the com-
pany, and (6) information about the risks associated with
the project or the company (Ahlers et al. 2015). Using
factor analysis, we created the following additional ‘in-
formation use’ dependent variables from these re-
sponses: (1) information about project and objectives
‘infoprojobj’, (2) information about person and their
2 T h e qu e s t i o n n a i r e i s p u b l i s h e d a t : h t t p : / / www.
crowdfundingonderzoek.nl/
H3
H1
+
+ H2
Gender
Information about
Person/previous projects
Independent variables (IV)
Type of 
return
Amount 
contributed
Risk 
awareness
Investment
by others
Information about
Fin. planning/risks
Information about
Project/objectives
Type of 
project
Control variables
Motiva-
tion
+
Relationship to the project creator
Out-crowd (no ties)
Dependent variables (DV)
Age
Education
level
Relationship to the project creator
In-crowd (strong and weak ties) 
Fig. 1. Analytical model
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track record ‘infopersprev’ and (3) information about
financial planning and risks ‘infofinrisk’.
3.2.2 Independent variables
To determine the influence of interpersonal ties on the
information use of funders, we included the relationship
to project creator as an independent variable (‘What was
your relationship with the project owner or business
owner before making your financial contribution
through crowdfunding?’). We combine the individual
answer categories to create new variables measuring
relationship strength, aggregating different types of re-
lationship to strong ties, weak ties or no ties (a similar
approach has been taken by Klyver et al. 2016). ‘Strong
ties’ included family, friends, initiator of the project or
employee (Kuppuswamy and Bayus 2015). ‘Weak ties’
consist of people who indicate that they know the person
behind the project or are a friend of friend, a business
relationship, customer, fan or visitor (Bruton et al.
2015). If there was no relationship, we coded it as ‘no
ties’. We created one extra answer category based on
manual answers entered in the category ‘other’, namely,
‘initiator/employee’. In the case that there were multiple
relationships indicated, we always selected the strongest
(i.e. if someone responded both ‘friend’ and ‘fan’, we
used ‘friend’).
3.2.3 Control variables
To account for the effect of other characteristics of the
funders, we include a number of control variables from
the survey such as age, gender (Klyver et al. 2016),
education level (Mollick 2014), type of project invested
in, amount funded, type of return (donation, in-kind,
financial) (Vismara 2016a, 2016b), motivation, invest-
ment of others and risk awareness.
Following earlier work (Calic and Mosakowski
2016; Hörisch 2015), we distinguish between for-profit,
social, cultural and ecological projects and coded all
projects into these categories as follows: (1) For-profit,
(2) Social, (3) Cultural, (4) Ecological.Multiple answers
were not coded. We asked an external researcher to
validate our coding and used this feedback to improve
our coding process (Patton 2002). If there was only a
description of the specific project (without a name), we
searched for a crowdfunding project which matched that
description and the time period, and if we found a
plausible match, we coded this project.
By including instrumental (vs. value-based) motiva-
tion as a control variable, we control for one of the
mechanisms through which we expect relationship
strength to influence the type of informational need.
We do this in order to focus on the behavioral intention
of the project funder and quality signals as key mecha-
nisms to overcome informational asymmetries in our
model (Vismara 2016a). We use ‘importance of security
of getting a promised return’ (securityreturn) as a proxy
for instrumental motivation. Consistent with cognitive
evaluation theory, the intrinsic motivation of lenders to
provide capital is undermined when entrepreneurs focus
on future extrinsic rewards associated with lending
(Allison et al. 2015). We also control for the influence
of others investing in the project (herding effect)
(Bikhchandani et al. 1992; Vismara 2016b) by including
the variable ‘knowing the financial contributions made
by others’ (knowingfincontriboth) in our analysis.
F ina l l y, we con t ro l f o r r i s k awa rene s s
(professionalism) of crowdfunders, since we expect ex-
perienced investors to use more information than ama-
teur investors. We use the statement ‘I keep in mind the
consideration that to invest through crowdfunding in a
company can be a high risk investment’ as a proxy for
risk awareness.
3.2.4 Data analysis
Most variables were assessed on a 5-point Likert scale
(Dillman 2000). The level of ties (strong, weak and no
ties) and type of crowdfunding (donation, reward and
financial return) were entered as dummy variables, with
reward-based crowdfunding being the reference case.
Amount invested, gender and education have different
scales. The data analysis was conducted in several steps
(Hair 2010). First, we thoroughly screened the dataset:
cases with missing values have been excluded. Second,
we recorded central variables based on our theoretical
framework. Third, we used a factor analysis to deter-
mine influential variables and to eliminate redundancy
amongst variables in the survey, in particular, to define
factor loadings for the various dependent variables de-
scribing ‘informational use’. Fourth, we conducted ex-
ploratory data analysis, highlighting how crowdfunders
with different relationship strengths to the project owner
(in-crowd, out-crowd; differently defined) differ with
respect to the following: motivation, objectives, amount
invested, personal characteristics, etc., followed by a
more structured correlation analysis (see Table 3 in
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Appendix). Finally, as our dependent variable is of
ordinal nature, we conducted ordered logistic regres-
sions to determine the explanatory power of our inde-
pendent variables (Agresti 2010; Hair 2010). Ordered
logistic regression does not require normally distributed
variables and can deal with metric and non-metric inde-
pendent variables as well as non-linear effects. It also
has relaxed assumptions regarding heteroskedastic var-
iables (Hair 2010).
4 Results
4.1 Descriptive statistics
Table 2 in the Appendix provides descriptive statistics of
our dependent, independent and control variables. The
first three rows are our dependent variables measuring
the information use of funders. The next three rows
describe our independent variables (strong, weak and
no ties). The remainder of the rows describe our control
variables. In our full model, 283 observations report on
all variables, of which 72 funders engaged in donation-
based crowdfunding; 163 contributed to reward-based
projects, and 48 contributed to campaigns that are ex-
pected to yield a financial return. The importance of
information about the project and its objective is gener-
ally very high (mean of 4.3) followed by information
about the entrepreneur (3.7) and information about the
financial aspects and risks of the campaign (3.3). Whilst
very few investors have low information needs on all
dimensions, only 40% of funders score highly (4 to 5)
on the importance of all information for their decision
making. About 18% of the respondents have strong ties
to the project creator, about one half have weak ties, and
approximately one third of all respondents have no ties.
The average amount invested lies in the range of € 101–
€ 250. There is a slight bias towards male respondents
(63%). The average age of respondents lies in the range
of 35–44 years old. Respondents are on average highly
educated, holding a university bachelor degree. The
correlation table including all dependent, independent
and control variables is presented in Table 3 in the
Appendix. Several statistically significant correlations
between our dependent variables and relationship
strength are reported. Some control variables are also
statistically significantly correlated with at least one of
the information variables.
4.2 Determinants of information use of crowdfunders
Our models (1–6, see Table 1) allow analysis of the
importance of several types of information used by
crowdfunders according to relationship strength be-
tween funder and project owner. We enter both strong
and weak ties into the regression as dummy variables,
using no ties as a reference case. Our results show that
relationship strength has significant effects on the im-
portance of different types of information.
First, our regression model shows that funders
with strong or weak ties attach significantly higher
importance to information about the project creator
and their previous projects than funders with no ties.
This supports our hypothesis 1 (H1). We differenti-
ate this result across crowdfunding types in two
steps. As a first step, in our regression model we
add dummy variables for both financial return and
donation crowdfunding, using reward-based
crowdfunding as a base case (this is the largest
sample). We find significantly higher information
is required about the person and their previous pro-
jects for both financial return and donation
crowdfunding compared to the reference reward
crowdfunding case (independent of ties). As a sec-
ond step, to analyse the effect of ties on information
needs within each type of crowdfunding, we com-
puted the full model again specifically for the sub-
sets of donation-based, reward-based and financial
return crowdfunding respectively (Tables 4, 5, and 6
in Appendix). For donation-based crowdfunding, we
find no statistically significant effect of relationship
strength on information about the person behind the
project and their track record. Within reward-based
crowdfunding, both funders with strong and weak
ties attach more importance to the information about
the project creator than those with no ties. In finan-
cial return crowdfunding campaigns, funders with
strong ties attach more importance to information
about the person than those with no ties, whereas
funders with weak ties show no significant differ-
ence in information needs about the project creator
compared to those without ties. We therefore con-
clude that relationship strength drives an increased
need for information about the project team, in par-
ticular, for reward and financial (debt and equity)
crowdfunding.
Second, only for donation crowdfunding do we find
evidence that out-crowd funders rely more on
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information about the project and its objectives com-
pared to in-crowd funders (an effect in line with hypoth-
esis 2). This is driven by the significantly lower need for
information about the project and its objectives in
donation crowdfunding by funders with weak ties,
who rely less on this information than those with strong
ties or no ties (a U-shaped relationship between project
information need and the strength of ties).
Table 1 Results for all types of crowdfunding
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Infoprojobj Infopersprev Infofinrisk Infoprojobj Infopersprev Infofinrisk
Strongties 0.134 1.185*** 0.101
(0.347) (0.331) (0.330)
Weakties −0.377 0.903*** 0.196
(0.258) (0.247) (0.244)
Noties 0.308 −0.940*** −0.176
(0.247) (0.235) (0.233)
Keepinmindrisk 0.110 0.120 −0.0404 0.118 0.127 −0.0418
(0.101) (0.0994) (0.100) (0.101) (0.0993) (0.0999)
Knowingfincontriboth 0.108 0.0287 0.384*** 0.117 0.0365 0.383***
(0.111) (0.109) (0.108) (0.111) (0.109) (0.108)
Profit −0.654* −0.143 −0.430 −0.659* −0.179 −0.439
(0.346) (0.330) (0.333) (0.346) (0.331) (0.332)
Social 0.452 0.0647 −0.396 0.505 0.0634 −0.409
(0.307) (0.290) (0.295) (0.308) (0.291) (0.295)
Cultural 0.124 −0.241 −0.570 0.227 −0.209 −0.593
(0.381) (0.365) (0.369) (0.378) (0.362) (0.367)
Ecological 0.825*** −0.386 0.141 0.838*** −0.357 0.144
(0.318) (0.299) (0.303) (0.317) (0.299) (0.302)
Amount −0.0261 0.0160 0.132*** −0.0184 0.0129 0.131***
(0.0496) (0.0475) (0.0489) (0.0494) (0.0476) (0.0490)
Gender 0.300 0.303 0.139 0.310 0.301 0.139
(0.241) (0.229) (0.233) (0.241) (0.229) (0.233)
Age 0.269** 0.174* 0.177* 0.270** 0.184* 0.175
(0.113) (0.105) (0.107) (0.113) (0.105) (0.107)
Education 0.0244 −0.103 −0.0202 0.0169 −0.0977 −0.0193
(0.0709) (0.0685) (0.0663) (0.0704) (0.0684) (0.0664)
Securityreturn 0.533*** 0.506*** 0.456*** 0.510*** 0.499*** 0.458***
(0.117) (0.110) (0.109) (0.117) (0.109) (0.110)
Donation 0.149 0.809*** 0.451 0.123 0.776*** 0.447
(0.295) (0.286) (0.294) (0.293) (0.285) (0.293)
Financial return 0.260 0.584* 0.878*** 0.225 0.557* 0.884***
(0.344) (0.313) (0.317) (0.343) (0.313) (0.316)
Observations 287 287 283 287 287 283
Pseudo R2 0.0633 0.0536 0.0599 0.0607 0.0519 0.0598
LR Chi2 53.59 57.29 67.01 51.38 55.47 66.93
Prob < Chi2 3.07e−06 7.33e−07 1.51e−08 3.58e−06 7.19e−07 6.90e−09
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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Overall, and for reward and financial return
crowdfunding individually, we find no evidence that
out-crowd funders rely more on information about the
project than in-crowd funders. We therefore reject our
second hypothesis (H2) both for our aggregated model
and for reward and financial return crowdfunding; a
higher information need about the project and its objec-
tives only holds for those funders with no ties partici-
pating in donation crowdfunding in relation to funders
with weak ties in donation crowdfunding.
Third, we find evidence that in financial return
crowdfunding, out-crowd funders rely more on infor-
mation about financial planning and risk than in-crowd
funders. This result is driven mostly by funders with
strong ties, who indicate a significantly lower informa-
tion need for financial planning and risk than funders
with no ties. This decreased information need is not
observed for funders with weak ties. For donation and
reward crowdfunding, and in our model that includes all
types of crowdfunding, we find no significant differ-
ences in information needs about financial planning and
risks for any strength of ties. Hence, our hypothesis 3
(H3) is supported for financial return (debt and equity)
crowdfunding and rejected for reward and donation
crowdfunding.
4.3 Types of crowdfunding projects
We also investigated the influence of different types of
projects on the use of information about the project,
entrepreneur and financial planning and risks by funders
with different strength of ties. We carried out this anal-
ysis by adding project-type dummies to the full model
(profit, social, ecological and cultural). First, we find no
influence of project type on the information need about
the project owner. Second, we find that the importance
of information about the project and its objectives varies
with the project type. In for-profit campaigns, funders
attach less importance to information about the project
and its objectives. In campaigns with an ecological
purpose, this effect is reversed. These effects are con-
sistent across all relationship types. In donation-based
and reward-based crowdfunding, the coefficients for
both for-profit and ecological projects are higher. The
importance of information about the project and its
objectives is high in donation-based crowdfunding for
ecological projects. Also, in the presence of strong ties,
the negative coefficient for for-profit projects disap-
pears. Third, the importance of information about
finance and risks does not vary with the type of project
in our full model that includes all crowdfunding types.
Interestingly, within reward-based crowdfunding (our
largest subset), funders of cultural and for-profit projects
attach less importance to information about finance and
risks than those funding social and ecological projects.
This could indicate that these projects display higher
informational asymmetries related to their social and
ecological goals versus cultural and for-profit projects.
Financial return crowdfunding exhibits no significantly
different information use based on the type of project,
except for a decreased information use about the owner
and her track record.
4.4 Control variables
As for our control variables, age and security of a
promised return (which we interpret as instrumental
motivation) show a statistically significant positive
relationship to nearly all information variables in our
full model. Age is only insignificant for information
needs about finance and risk. When we split up the
data into different types of crowdfunding, age loses
most of its significance. The positive significant
relationship between instrumental motivation and
information needs remains consistent in all types of
crowdfunding, except for information about finance
and risks in financial return crowdfunding. This is
probably due to lack of variation within this catego-
ry (financial return funders are likely to be instru-
mentally motivated). We find a strong positive mod-
erating relationship for donation- and financial re-
turn crowdfunding regarding information about the
entrepreneur and track-record as well as information
about financials and risk in financial return
crowdfunding. As expected, the size of the invest-
ment (amount) drives the importance of information
about financial planning and risks. Risk awareness is
not significantly correlated with the importance of
information in general. Knowing the financial con-
tribution of others increases the importance of infor-
mation about financial planning and risks, indicating
some additionality between knowing the contribu-
tion of others and information gathering for particu-
larly out-crowd, instrumentally motivated funders—
the contribution of others increases the chance that
the project will be fully funded and therefore in-
creases the expected payoff of time taken to gather
financial and risk information.
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4.5 Robustness checks
In order to check the robustness of our findings, we
checked for multi-collinearity i.e. the correlation
amongst explanatory variables. Investigating the vari-
a n c e i n f l a t i on f a c t o r s (V IF s ) r e v e a l s no
multicollinearity, given the mean VIF of 1.5 in models
including all types of crowdfunding and 1.6, 1.5, 1.7 in
models using donation-based, reward-based and finan-
cial return crowdfunding respectively (see Kutner et al.
2005).We also divided relationship-dependent variables
into in-crowd and out-crowd and calculated the models
again. The results remained consistent. As a robustness
check for the dependent variables (importance of infor-
mation), we included measures that incorporate these
types of information (quality of the project, reasons for
the existence of the project, information about the pro-
ject/objectives, knowledge and skills of the project cre-
ator and their passion, information about the person/
track record). Strong and weak ties positively influence
the importance of the knowledge and skills of the entre-
preneur and thus confirm our main results. In the case of
no ties to the project, this coefficient becomes negative,
which is also consistent with our results. As an alterna-
tive measure of our relationship strength variable, we
included the self-reported importance of the relationship
for the funding decision. A higher value drives the
information about the entrepreneur and previous pro-
jects, consistent with our main results.
5 Discussion
The guiding research question was ‘how does the type
of information used by crowdfunders vary with the
strength of their ties to project creators?’ Overcoming
information asymmetries, prevalent in the relationship
between financier and entrepreneur, especially for
young and innovative firms, has traditionally been a role
of venture capitalists that screen, select and monitor
potential targets and syndicate with other investors
through social networks to pool resources, exchange
information and spread the risks (Alexy et al. 2012;
Gompers and Lerner 2001; Manigart and Wright 2011;
Shane and Cable 2002; Ter Wal et al. 2016). Our re-
search adds to the informal investor and crowdfunding
literature on overcoming information asymmetries in
social networks by disentangling quality signals used
by crowdfunders to judge project quality (Audretsch
et al. 2012; Becker-Blease and Sohl 2015).
5.1 Information heterogeneity and social networks
of crowdfunders
First, researchers stressed the role of internal social
capital (early backers) as signals for funding success
(Ahlers et al. 2015; Colombo et al. 2015; Cumming
et al. 2015a; Vismara 2016a, 2016b). We add to this
line of research by differentiating types of information
required by potential investors, based on their relation-
ship with the project creator. Whereas in-crowd funders
rely on information about the person behind the cam-
paign and previous projects, there is no increased use of
information about financials and associated risks. These
results are in line with previous research on
crowdfunding motivation (Cholakova and Clarysse
2015). Our results show that in-crowd funders are not
just involved out of sympathy or relationship building
(we control for instrumental motivation) but also search
for information that signals project quality or behaviour-
al intentions thereby complementing earlier work that
found a positive relationship between strength of ties
and altruistic investment behaviour (Klyver et al. 2016).
The inclusion of the entrepreneurs’ social network in-
forms the funding decision in a similar way to the VC-
entrepreneur relationship (Huang and Knight 2015;
Manigart and Wright 2011; Shane and Cable 2002).
We extend previous work on the ‘wisdom of the
crowd’ in collective funding decisions (Mollick and
Nanda 2015; Surowiecki 2005) with regards to the use
of information about the project and the project creator.
Our research confirms the notion that relationships be-
tween investors and project creators facilitate the ex-
change of information about the entrepreneur and their
track record, a mechanism prevalent in VC/angel
investor-relationships (Bernstein et al. 2016b; Vismara
2016a). Our findings suggest that the in-crowd gathers
(soft) information about the management of the venture
(Ahlers et al. 2015; Cholakova and Clarysse 2015;
Cumming et al. 2015a).
Second, we find no consistent evidence for our hy-
pothesis that out-crowd funders rely more on informa-
tion about the project and its objectives in decision
making than in-crowd funders. This in contrast to pre-
dictions from previous studies (Ahlers et al. 2015;
Hornuf and Schwienbacher 2015). Even though they
do rely significantly less on information about the
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person than in-crowd investors, this is not being com-
pensated by a greater reliance on information about the
project. It raises concerns with regard to the quality of
decision making of out-crowd funders contrary to find-
ings in previous studies (Mollick and Nanda 2015).
Third, we hypothesised that out-crowd funders in-
vestigate information about financial planning and risk
more thoroughly to search for quality signals and com-
mitment (Ahlers et al. 2015; Blumberg and Letterie
2007; Busenitz et al. 2005; Hornuf and Schwienbacher
2015). We find that this hypothesis holds for financial
crowdfunding. In our full model, we find no support for
this notion and also find that funders in general—with or
without ties—attach a lower importance to this type of
information.
Crowdfunding decision making can thus be
characterised as relationship-driven (Bernstein et al.
2016b; Colombo et al. 2015). In this regard,
crowdfunders, when aggregated across all types, appar-
ently behave differently to professional (VC) investors
who rely also on financial due diligence and an align-
ment of goals between venture and investor (Audretsch
et al. 2012; Bernstein et al. 2016b; Busenitz et al. 2005).
This study also reveals interesting differences regarding
the use of information of distinct types of campaigns,
which adds to the understanding of funding dynamics
(Belleflamme et al. 2014; Calic and Mosakowski 2016;
Hornuf and Schwienbacher 2015; Mollick 2014). For-
profit project funders are significantly less interested in
information about the projects and its objectives than
others, particularly compared to ecological project
funders who attach a significantly higher importance
to the objective of a project. This could be explained
by either warm-glow or impact motivations (Andreoni
1990; Maas and Liket 2010). These effects are strongest
in donation-based crowdfunding. Our findings corrobo-
rate recent studies on crowdfunding social and environ-
mental enterprises and projects reporting mixed evi-
dence of funding success to sustainability orientation
and goals (Calic and Mosakowski 2016; Hörisch 2015).
5.2 Information heterogeneity across types
of crowdfunding
We find more support for our hypotheses when we
separate distinct types of crowdfunding. The mecha-
nisms through whichwe expect social networks to affect
informational needs (motivation, intention of the project
owner and quality of the project) seem to lead to
different information needs for donation, reward, and
financial (debt and equity) crowdfunding decisions.
Donation-based crowdfunding is often associated with
non-financial motivations and non-profit organisations,
whereas reward-based and financial crowdfunding are
more commonly associated with for-profit or social
entrepreneurs and financial motivation (Ahlers et al.
2015; Cholakova and Clarysse 2015; Mollick and
Nanda 2015). In financial - debt or equity -
crowdfunding, return for funders depends on the ability
of the venture to generate enough profit to pay back a
loan (debt) or create an exit scenario (equity). These
crowdfunders rank the support to family, friends or local
business very low as a motivation to invest (Nesta 2014;
Vismara 2016b). Others distinguish between equity and
reward-based crowdfunding and find that both are driv-
en by financial motives, whether in-kind or financial
(Cholakova and Clarysse 2015).
Before accounting for relationship strength, we find
significant differences in information needs between
crowdfunding types. In general, financial return (debt
and equity) funders have higher information needs
about the entrepreneur than reward funders. This is in
line with VC literature predictions (Alexy et al. 2012;
Bernstein et al. 2016b; Busenitz et al. 2005; Shane and
Cable 2002) as well as Ahlers et al. (2015) who indicate
that financial return crowdfunding leads to higher con-
cerns of moral hazard and a greater need for quality
signals compared to reward and donation crowdfunding
due to the long-term commitment to the enterprise,
higher risk and expected returns. Low fears of moral
hazard and a focus on product information render all
types of reward crowdfunders less interested in infor-
mation about the project owner.
Our granular models, in which we account for the
effect of relationship strength per type of crowdfunding,
show that in both reward and financial return
crowdfunding, in-crowd funders have a significantly
higher information need about the person behind the
project than out-crowd funders. This suggests that even
at the lower level of informational need within reward-
based crowdfunding, relationship strength plays a role,
thus adding a novel insight to the literature on the role of
social networks in crowdfunding.
Interestingly, donation-based funders show signifi-
cantly higher levels of information need about the per-
son behind the project than reward-based funders, at
similar levels as financial return crowdfunding. This is
counter to expectations of Belleflamme et al. (2014) and
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Ahlers (2015), who argue that in donation-based
crowdfunding the degree of asymmetric information is
of little importance because other intangible factors
increase the funders’ utility. We explain this from a
motivation perspective. Donation crowdfunding can be
likened to philanthropy, where ‘returns’ can be in the
form of ‘warm glow’ (Andreoni 1990), societal impact
(Maas and Liket 2010) or community benefits
(Belleflamme et al. 2014). Donation funders interested
in the (social, cultural or ecological) impact of their
donation are more likely to be motivated to look for
quality signals, indicating that their money will be well
spent, before pledging their funds.
When we look at the effect of strength of ties on
information needs in donation-based crowdfunding,
we find no increased demand for information on
either the project creator or financial planning and
risks. However, for out-crowd donation-based
crowdfunding, we find a significantly higher infor-
mation need about the project and its objectives than
for in-crowd funders. This is driven by a negative
effect of weak ties in particular. This lower interest
of weak tie funders in information about the project
may point to a (weak) relationship motivation to
donate instead of interest in the project and its
impact. This is in contrast to, on the one hand,
strong tie funders who may display interest in the
project due to their strong relationship and, on the
other hand, due to out-crowd funders who donate
primarily out of interest in the project, without a
social relationship.
We also find that compared to reward-based and
donation crowdfunding, financial return funders, with
and without ties, are significantly more interested in
information about financial planning and risks. The risk
profile of reward-based crowdfunding is lower than debt
or equity crowdfunding since they can be seen as early
adopting consumers (Hornuf and Schwienbacher 2015;
Vismara 2016a) and their return does not depend on the
long-term profitability of the enterprise, only on the
ability to deliver the promised product. Non-delivery
rates on the largest reward-based platform Kickstarter
are approximately 9% (Mollick 2015), which points to a
much lower risk than average venture failure rates
(Aldrich and Ruef 2006). Within the subset of financial
return crowdfunding, we find that out-crowd funders
have a higher need for information about finance and
risk than in-crowd funders. Our results indicate that a
strong relationship appears to substitute financial due
diligence and complements the importance of teams
quality signals as financial return funders with strong
ties are less interested in information about finance and
risk (Ahlers et al. 2015; Bernstein et al. 2016b; Uzzi
1999).
6 Conclusions and implications
6.1 Conclusions
Our study offers the first detailed analysis of the hetero-
geneity in information use by crowdfunders and more
particular how information use is affected by social
networks within different types of crowdfunding.
This paper highlights the heterogeneity in infor-
mation use by crowdfunders that are differently con-
nected to the project creator. Funders from the in-
crowd attach more importance to information about
the project creator, as expected, but funders from the
out-crowd do not rely more on information about the
project, except for donation-based crowdfunding.
Our findings suggest a trade-off between strong ties
and the importance of information about financial
planning and risks in the context of financial return
(equity and debt) crowdfunding. In general, this
information is perceived as less important and is
not influenced by social network ties between
crowdfunder and project for donation and reward
crowdfunding. Donation and financial return
crowdfunders attach more importance to the infor-
mation about the person behind the project which
reflects a relationship-based funding approach,
whereas reward-based crowdfunders care signifi-
cantly less about the project creator as they focus
on the product as specific output with lower infor-
mation asymmetry issues. Additionally, the informa-
tion use of crowdfunders is influenced by the type of
project they invest in. For-profit project funders
need less information about a project and its objec-
tives whereas ecological projects exhibit a higher
need for this type of information.
6.2 Implications
Our research has important implications for project de-
velopers and platform managers. Based on the results of
our research, platform managers and project owners can
customise their campaign directly to the group of
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funders they would like to attract, based on their rela-
tionship strength and also on insights from our control
variables (age, gender, education, instrumental motiva-
tion or financial means). More importantly, it is possible
to deploy a tailored and staged in-crowd/out-crowd
process of crowdfunding (see Fig. 2). We indicate ‘av-
erage’ information use when coefficients are small or
not significant.
Project creators can focus on providing detailed in-
formation about themselves and their previous projects
to potential in-crowd funders (strong and weak ties) and
display more summarised information about the project,
its objectives, financial planning and risks. For potential
out-crowd funders, the campaign should instead focus
on information about the project and its objectives (es-
pecially for donation-based campaigns) and financial
planning/risks (for financial return crowdfunding) and
summarise personal information about the project
creator.
6.3 Limitations and future research
Although this research provides new empirical evi-
dence on decision making by crowdfunders, there
are some limitations to our study and interesting
pathways for further research. Limitations arise first-
ly from the use of the survey instrument, where we
cannot control for non-response or social-
desirability bias. Secondly, as the sampling followed
a snowball method, the composition of groups (age,
gender, education, experience with crowdfunding)
does not necessarily represent the general population
of c rowdfunders . Our sub-samples wi th in
crowdfunding types are relatively small (50–160
respondents) which limits the statistical power of
our analyses. Third, our dataset was collected in
2013, a time at which crowdfunding was emergent.
More recent datasets will probably provide different
insights as the phenomenon of crowdfunding has
become more widespread, in particular equity
crowdfunding. Broader samples could give more
insights into the motivations and behaviour of
crowdfunders, including barriers to crowdfunding.
A weakness of the survey itself is that we cannot
compare the use of information by funders with the
use of information of those that decided not to fund,
since this question was only asked to the funders.
Finally, we cannot distinguish between early- and
late-stage funders, as information about investment
timing is missing.
To further this research, a combination of field
experiment and real-time data from platforms where
we could observe the relationship between use of
information, strength of ties and commitment of
others during the funding decision in real life would
provide more insight into the causality of the rela-
tions found in this study. Combining project-level
investment data with survey data about the funders
would elicit a clearer and more robust picture of
funding decisions (Jick 1979) and eliminate poten-
tial common method bias (Podsakoff et al. 2003).
Finally, it would be valuable to explore other insti-
tutional contexts outside of the Netherlands, with
differently developed financial markets (including
angel investing and venture capital), levels of entre-
preneurship, and regulation of financial markets and
crowdfunding in particular.
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Information 
use regarding: Project & objectives
Person & previous
projects
Financial 
planning & risks
Strong ties Average (all)
High (all)
Average (donation)
Average (all)
Low (financial)
Weak ties
Average (all)
Low (donation)
High (all)
Average (financial)
Average (all)
No ties
Average  (all)
High (donation)
Low (all)
Average (donation)
Average (all)
Fig. 2 Information use
heterogeneity of crowdfunders
with different strength of ties to
project creator
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Appendix
Descriptive statistics
Table 2 Number of cases, means, standard deviations
Variable Obs Mean Std Dev Min Max Variable description
Infoprojobj 283 4.30212 0.7887029 1 5 Likert scale (1–5) average of importance of information about (1) the
project or company and (2) objectives of project or company
Infopersprev 281 3.706406 0.9004532 1 5 Likert scale (1–5) average of importance of information about (1) the
person or organization behind the project or the company and (2)
previous projects of the person or organization behind it
Infofinrisk 283 3.30742 1.016276 1 5 Likert scale (1–5) average of importance of information about (1)
financial planning of the project or company and (2) risks associated
with the project or the company
Strongties 283 0.180212 0.3850448 0 1 Dummy: 1 is strong ties (family, friend, initiator/employee)
Weakties 283 0.4770318 0.500357 0 1 Dummy: 1 is weak ties (I know the person, friend of friend, business
relationship)
Noties 283 0.3427562 0.4754716 0 1 Dummy: 1 is no ties (There is no relationship)
Knowingfincontriboth 283 2.501767 1.063163 1 5 Likert scale 1–5: How important is knowing the financial contribution
by others
Keepinmindrisk 283 3.667845 1.227315 1 5 Likert scale (1–5): I keep in mind the consideration that investing
through crowdfunding in an company can be a high risk investment
Profit 283 0.3674912 0.4829758 0 1 Dummy. Type of project invested in. 1 = for-profit, 0 other.
Social 283 0.4416961 0.4974687 0 1 Dummy. Type of project invested in. 1 = social, 0 other
Cultural 283 0.3250883 0.4692376 0 1 Dummy. Type of project invested in. 1 = cultural, 0 other
Ecological 283 0.2438163 0.4301438 0 1 Dummy. Type of project invested in. 1 = ecological, 0 other
Amount 283 5.190813 2.519214 1 11 Scale (1–11): less than €10/€11–€25/€ 26–€ 50/€ 51–€ 100/€ 101–€
250/€ 251–€ 500/more than € 500
Gender 283 1.388693 0.4883168 1 2 Dummy male = 1; female = 2
Age 283 4.035336 1.057977 1 7 Scale (1–7): under 18 years/18–24 year/25–34 years/35–44 years/45–
54 years/55–64 years/over 65 years
Education 283 8.007067 1.584484 1 10 Scale (1–10): lower education or primary edn/lower vocational edn/
high school or VMBO/HAVO/VWO/MBO/HBO/univ bachelor/
univ master’s or doctoral/post-doc
Securityreturn 283 3.60424 1.08777 1 5 Importance of the security that there is a promised return
Donation 283 0.254417 0.4363045 0 1 Dummy: What type of financial return have you received or will you
receive in exchange for your financial contribution? Answer: no
reward
Reward 283 0.5759717 0.49507 0 1 Dummy: What type of financial return have you received or will you
receive in exchange for your financial contribution? Answer: reward
(e.g. a product, service or mention your name)
Financialreturn 283 0.1696113 0.3759558 0 1 Dummy: What type of financial return have you received or will you
receive in exchange for your financial contribution? Answer: a
financial return (e.g. in the case of a loan or investment)
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Differentiated analyses
Table 4 Results for donation-based crowdfunding
Variables Infoprojobj Infopersprev Infofinrisk Infoprojobj Infopersprev Infofinrisk
Strongties −0.719 1.063 0.315
(0.760) (0.709) (0.673)
Weakties −1.048* 0.155 0.350
(0.556) (0.495) (0.525)
Noties 0.976* −0.374 −0.340
(0.534) (0.468) (0.489)
Keepinmindrisk −0.0788 0.207 −0.235 −0.0824 0.196 −0.234
(0.201) (0.182) (0.189) (0.200) (0.181) (0.189)
Knowingfincontriboth −0.422* 0.00908 0.0197 −0.412* 0.0294 0.0198
(0.237) (0.240) (0.227) (0.236) (0.242) (0.227)
Profit −1.602* −1.057 0.205 −1.619* −1.129 0.208
(0.950) (0.913) (1.040) (0.948) (0.911) (1.038)
Social 1.179 −0.415 −0.926 1.197 −0.391 −0.929
(0.837) (0.793) (0.862) (0.838) (0.802) (0.860)
Cultural 1.159 −0.903 −0.940 1.252 −0.695 −0.947
(0.928) (0.867) (0.917) (0.910) (0.863) (0.909)
Ecological 1.866** 0.526 −0.801 1.895** 0.562 −0.800
(0.853) (0.831) (0.899) (0.848) (0.827) (0.899)
Amount 0.0637 0.0947 0.125 0.0635 0.0951 0.126
(0.103) (0.101) (0.0999) (0.103) (0.102) (0.0987)
Gender 0.298 0.766 0.636 0.292 0.742 0.635
(0.498) (0.486) (0.468) (0.497) (0.484) (0.467)
Age 0.185 −0.132 0.327 0.207 −0.0993 0.324
(0.235) (0.216) (0.226) (0.230) (0.214) (0.220)
Education −0.0767 −0.211 0.0676 −0.0893 −0.250 0.0692
(0.163) (0.157) (0.143) (0.161) (0.156) (0.139)
Securityreturn 0.621*** 0.691*** 0.759*** 0.617*** 0.675*** 0.758***
(0.224) (0.206) (0.220) (0.224) (0.204) (0.220)
Observations 74 74 72 74 74 72
Pseudo R2 0.101 0.0925 0.0863 0.100 0.0858 0.0863
LR Chi2 21.12 24.64 24.38 20.90 22.86 24.38
Prob < Chi2 0.0705 0.0257 0.0278 0.0519 0.0289 0.0180
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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Table 5 Results for reward-based crowdfunding
Variables Infoprojobj Infopersprev Infofinrisk Infoprojobj Infopersprev Infofinrisk
Strongties 0.316 1.013** −0.0798
(0.457) (0.427) (0.439)
Weakties −0.354 1.194*** 0.0959
(0.352) (0.337) (0.330)
Noties 0.198 −1.145*** −0.0562
(0.339) (0.320) (0.318)
Keepinmindrisk 0.262* 0.187 −0.0310 0.282** 0.181 −0.0361
(0.136) (0.133) (0.130) (0.135) (0.132) (0.129)
Knowingfincontriboth 0.225 −0.0781 0.501*** 0.230 −0.0760 0.503***
(0.157) (0.150) (0.148) (0.157) (0.150) (0.148)
Profit −0.769* −0.314 −0.764* −0.807* −0.311 −0.758*
(0.463) (0.436) (0.457) (0.461) (0.435) (0.456)
Social 0.329 0.193 −0.362 0.403 0.173 −0.386
(0.402) (0.377) (0.383) (0.401) (0.373) (0.378)
Cultural 0.0381 −0.241 −0.831* 0.0889 −0.261 −0.854*
(0.495) (0.466) (0.481) (0.491) (0.464) (0.478)
Ecological 1.022** −0.408 0.252 0.947** −0.391 0.272
(0.432) (0.403) (0.406) (0.429) (0.400) (0.403)
Amount 0.00523 0.0277 0.116* 0.0182 0.0264 0.112
(0.0688) (0.0666) (0.0695) (0.0684) (0.0664) (0.0689)
Gender 0.329 0.135 0.106 0.346 0.135 0.107
(0.322) (0.307) (0.316) (0.321) (0.308) (0.317)
Age 0.217 0.178 0.194 0.209 0.177 0.191
(0.155) (0.145) (0.149) (0.155) (0.145) (0.148)
Education 0.0653 −0.0850 −0.00993 0.0677 −0.0889 −0.0146
(0.0897) (0.0895) (0.0876) (0.0887) (0.0894) (0.0871)
Securityreturn 0.595*** 0.359** 0.354** 0.572*** 0.362** 0.355**
(0.167) (0.156) (0.155) (0.166) (0.156) (0.155)
Observations 165 164 163 165 164 163
Pseudo R2 0.0798 0.0386 0.0461 0.0742 0.0382 0.0457
LR Chi2 40.94 23.92 30.28 38.08 23.71 30.07
Prob < Chi2 9.74e−05 0.0318 0.00430 0.000149 0.0223 0.00272
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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Table 6 Results for financial return crowdfunding
Variables Infoprojobj Infopersprev Infofinrisk Infoprojobj Infopersprev Infofinrisk
Strongties 1.363 2.714** −2.158*
(1.343) (1.114) (1.236)
Weakties 0.989 0.899 −0.669
(0.797) (0.745) (0.720)
Noties −1.030 −1.187* 0.746
(0.787) (0.720) (0.718)
Keepinmindrisk 0.542 −0.368 0.190 0.546 −0.266 0.119
(0.497) (0.458) (0.457) (0.496) (0.448) (0.449)
Knowingfincontriboth 0.285 0.158 0.743** 0.292 0.193 0.667**
(0.290) (0.265) (0.294) (0.290) (0.266) (0.281)
Profit 0.832 0.534 0.199 0.852 0.600 0.121
(1.107) (0.952) (0.933) (1.111) (0.938) (0.931)
Social 0.446 0.100 −0.112 0.483 0.167 −0.136
(0.943) (0.827) (0.825) (0.937) (0.811) (0.831)
Cultural −0.0182 −0.964 1.277 0.0300 −0.844 1.030
(1.509) (1.350) (1.348) (1.499) (1.317) (1.322)
Ecological −0.975 −1.529** 1.214 −0.894 −1.184 0.793
(0.889) (0.779) (0.801) (0.849) (0.742) (0.730)
Amount −0.255 0.00886 0.316** −0.245 0.0515 0.264*
(0.167) (0.149) (0.152) (0.164) (0.144) (0.145)
Gender 1.624* 0.294 −1.085 1.592* 0.245 −0.913
(0.838) (0.718) (0.730) (0.828) (0.701) (0.711)
Age 1.037*** 0.360 −0.235 1.051*** 0.454 −0.281
(0.380) (0.308) (0.313) (0.379) (0.305) (0.309)
Education −0.121 −0.0629 −0.463** −0.124 −0.0640 −0.410*
(0.248) (0.200) (0.230) (0.248) (0.197) (0.224)
Securityreturn 0.866** 1.057*** 0.288 0.846* 0.938*** 0.400
(0.435) (0.355) (0.373) (0.433) (0.350) (0.363)
Observations 48 49 48 48 49 48
Pseudo R2 0.211 0.150 0.157 0.210 0.125 0.144
LR Chi2 22.62 22.78 23.13 22.52 18.98 21.21
Prob < Chi2 0.0465 0.0444 0.0402 0.0321 0.0890 0.0474
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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